# On Hiromatsu's Analysis of the Cognitive World: Toward a Dynamic Reformulation of the Critique of Reification

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The philosophy of Wataru Hiromatsu (1933–) is distinguished from the work of most other Japanese philosophers by its high degree of systematicity and methodical articulation.[1] From this it does not follow, however, that his work is readily subject to unambiguous interpretation. Hiromatsu's key concept of reification, for example, is, as it will be suggested below, less unambiguous and transparent than it may at first glance appear to be.

In his — primarily synchronic (SK, 20) — structural analysis of the phenomenal world, Hiromatsu seeks to establish his fundamental view of "the primacy of relation" (SI, vii, 460) over the terms related. It is in accordance with this relationist world-view that he formulates the 'principal' meaning of reification: the substantializing misconception by the consciousness involved of what is relational from the scholarly-reflective point of view (BK, 99). A continual critique and overcoming of this reification constitutes the very task of his philosophical project. Yet, when he at times tends to go beyond the synchronic framework, Hiromatsu appears to suggest a somewhat different conception of reification. For example, with regard to his own account of linguistic phenomena, he remarks: "While in this article I have studied things provisionally as they are reified in the mode of *langue*, it is necessary in a more rigorous discussion to note that the linguistic formation is 'produced' (reproduced) each time that it is spoken and understood in hearing..." (MKK, 190). What, and in what sense, remains reified in his theoretical presentation which claims to have overcome reifying notions? To the extent that Hiromatsu's philosophy opens itself to a *dynamic* dimension, the dimension of structural change or structuralization (cf. KKK, 259), the concept of reification appears to undergo a shift in meaning. In the present paper, I will seek to make explicit this conceptual change, which is not formulated as such in Hiromatsu's own texts.

As a preliminary approach to Hiromatsu's philosophy, this study confines itself largely to his theory about the *cognitive* aspect of the world, that part of his work which has so far been most fully developed.[2] In the first section, I will outline his analysis of the cognitive world, known as the theory of fourfold structure, in its primarily synchronic framework. This framework will be dessolved progressively in the second section, the major part of my presentation. In it I will pursue Hiromatsu's own dynamic conceptions, one step further than he himself explicitly does, up to the point where his

critique of reification is radically reformulated in terms of what I call the displacement of meaning.

## 1. Hiromatsu's Analysis of the Cognitive World

Hiromatsu's philosophy sets as its general task a replacement of modern substantialist ontology by the primacy of relation (SI, vif.) and of the subject/object schema of modern epistemology by what he calls intersubjective fourfold structure (SI, xi).[3] His formulation of his own ontological-epistemological views is therefore one with his critique of reification, a concept which he has taken over from Karl Marx[4] and extended to the general philosophical dimension in such a way that it refers to the hypostatization not only of values, but also of cognitive meanings (BK, 282).

Hiromatsu analyzes the structure of phenomena "as they unfold *cognitively*" (SI, ix) in *Sekai no kyodoshukanteki-sonzaikozo* (The Intersubjective Being-Structure of the World) (1972) and several related works, most elaborately in *Sonzai to imi* (Being and Meaning), vol. 1 (1982). Phenomena in the cognitive dimension, that is, "in a provisional abstraction from such moments as practical significance or value significance" (SI, 5), range from perception and representation to linguistically mediated judgment (SK, 24).[5] For Hiromatsu, as for phenomenalists like Ernst Mach,[6] these phenomena are neither simply subjective nor purely objective, but prior to the very division of subject and object (cf. SK, 41).[7]

Hiromatsu stresses, on the other hand, in not so much a phenomenalist as a quasi-phenomenological fashion (cf. SK, 42) that all phenomena are meaning-laden (SI, 4). As is illustrated by the case in which what is seen outside the window appears as a pine tree, "a phenomenon appears in itself always already *as something* more than a mere 'sensible' given" (SK, 24). In other words, the phenomenon is such that, "in showing itself..., it always already shows something else" (SK, 25). Hiromatsu refers to this 'something more' or 'something else' as "the meaningful cognized (*imiteki-shoshiki*),"[8] or simply as meaning, and the sensible or perspectival given (*Abschattung*) as "the phenomenal given (*gensoteki-shoyo*)" (SI, 39). All phenomena, in his view, comprise these two factors or "moments" linked to each other through 'as.' If we denote the phenomenal given by p and the meaningful cognized by [p] — in accordance with Hiromatsu's notation employed elsewhere for the Marxian value-form of commodities (ST, 146) —, the mode of being of phenomena may thus be expressed as: p as [p]. This 'as' connection, termed "equating unification," constitutes "the fundamental unity of 'otherness' (difference) and 'sameness' (identity)" of the two moments (SI, 149).[9]

This twofold or dual scheme of given/cognized, Hiromatsu continues, is "manifest most typically in the case of signs," such as a series of sounds or ink stains appearing as a meaningful word. Yet this twofoldness is not unique to such a specific kind of phenomena, but, conversely, all phenomena in a sense are "of a signitive (symbolic) character" (SK, 25). It is precisely by virtue of this general character of phenomena that signs in the

narrow sense can function as signs (SI, 41). From this point of view, Hiromatsu also designates the phenomenal given and the meaningful cognized as "signifier" and "signified," respectively, characterizing their 'as'-connection as a "symbolic combination" (SI, 149; cf. SK, 77; SI, 41).[10]

Hiromatsu seeks to desubstantialize these two moments of phenomena, especially the meaningful cognized or signified, by what may in a sense be characterized as an extension of the Saussurean view of signs to all phenomena (cf. HM, 277; PMN, 83). First, he argues, not only are all phenomena meaningful, but also any meaning exists only to the extent that it is tied to, or, as it were, "incarnated" (SK, 27) in a phenomenal given or signifier. In other words, far from being self-contained entities, both the given and the cognized can be what they are only in their interrelation in which the former appears as the latter (SI, 58, 68). Second, Hiromatsu points to the differential character of meaning: "It is not that the meaningful cognized A is distinguished from non-A because of A's independent self-identity, but that A is taken...as self-identical insofar as it is distinguished from non-A" (SI, 26; cf. SI, 72f.). In this way, with regard both to the relation between given and cognized and to the relation between different meanings, he offers a radically relationist account, rejecting the reifying notion of meaning as self-contained.

Hiromatsu goes on to characterize more closely the meaningful cognized in its contradistinction to the phenomenal given. Meaning is neither a "real object" referred to, nor a "mental image" associated with the phenomenal given. For what are called real objects as well as mental images are themselves phenomena, already comprising the two moments of given and cognized (SI, 18f.). Rather, Hiromatsu continues, meaning is marked by its "'ideal' character of being" (SK, 26; cf. SI, 79). The meaningful cognized (e.g. the meaning 'tree'), as which a series of phenomenal givens (that pine, this cedar, etc.) equally appear (SK, 26), exhibits a "universal, invariable, and translocal," in short, ideal character, whereas the givens are "particular, variable, and local," that is, real (SI, 21, 78; cf. SK, 26). It is crucial to note, however, that this ideality of meaning holds only insofar as one attempts in thought to "isolate" (SK, 26) the meaning from the whole phenomenon and to "treat it as an independent term." In other words, as Hiromatsu does not fail to remark, his — not ultimate though necessary — characterization of meaning as ideal is itself reificatory (SI, 17), a critical and self-critical insight that marks his decisive break with Husserlian phenomenology (cf. KZ, 77ff.; SK, 42). In an effort to avoid this reification, Hiromatsu redetermines the character of the meaningful cognized as something "functional," in the sense of the mathematical function into which specific values — corresponding to phenomenal givens — are each time inserted (SI, 22f. , 74ff.).[11] He holds this analogy to be viable insofar as the function is not considered in separation from the specific values it takes (cf. SI, 23).

This motif of the critique of reification further leads Hiromatsu to a certain relativization of the given/cognized distinction itself. He points to the possibility of the "multifold process" (SK, 36) or "multilayered structure" (STN, 90) in which the given/cognized formation at one level...stands in the position of a given in relation to a higher-level meaningful cognized" (SI, 7; cf. MKK, 71). Conversely speaking, the phenomenal given

at any level can be a twofold formation at a lower level. In the series of these different levels, he continues, "there is no fixed, unique lowest-level given" (SI, 8; cf. SK, 37). For, as soon as one is conscious of the phenomenal given as such, this can no longer be a pure given, but is already known as something (SI, 6ff; MKK, 70f.). It follows that so-called sense data as well as Machian sensible elements are not ultimate givens, but are already of a twofold character (SK, 38).

So far, while desubstantializing and relativizing the twofold scheme, Hiromatsu has restricted himself to the *gegenständliche*[12] or, in his own terminolgy, "known" side of the phenomena in a provisional abstraction from the subjective or "knowing" side. But, as he himself goes on to acknowledge, this, too, is reificatory (TI, 187). Rather, as it turns out, it is each time *for* someone that a phenomenal given appears as a meaningful cognized (SK, 29), and this someone — the "knower (*nochi*)" — is, just as "the known (*shochi*)," also of twofold character (SI, 87). For instance, when a child sees a cow, saying, "That's a doggie," it is indeed for the child, not for me, that the phenomenon appears as a doggie (SK, 29f). Yet, "without in a sense taking the cow as a dog, I could not even know that the child has 'mistaken' it for a dog" (SK, 30; cf. KZ, 91).[13] This illustrates the "self-dividing unity" of "oneself as oneself" and "oneself as (playing the role of) another" (SI, 134). While most manifestly seen in linguistic communication, this twofold scheme of 'someone as someone (else)' can be recognized generally (SK, 30). The latter someone, "initially a concrete individual," tends, through interhuman intercourse, to be depersonalized into "the one" (SI, 134; cf. SK, 33; STN, 96) or *das Man* (SK, 35, 188), so that the knower takes on the form of "someone as the one." Insofar as the known is attributed to this "someone as the one," Hiromatsu terms the someone the "knowing someone (*nochiteki-taregashi*)," and the one the "cognizing Someone (*noshikiteki-arumono*)."[14] Just like the meaningful cognized, the cognizing Someone, if considered separately from the real knowing someone, exhibits an ideal character (SI, 148; cf. SI, 135; SK, 33f.). Thus structured in parallel with the known, the knower "exists as a cognizing Someone who is more than a knowing someone" (SI, 132).

It might appear to the reader that Hiromatsu simply renames the subject the knower and the object the known, dividing each into two factors. Yet, unlike the traditional notions of subject and object, knower and known are not ontically separated (SI, 92), but are, as is illustrated by "the expansion and contraction of the bodily self" (SI, 98), just the two aspects of a "state of union" (SI, 96). This internal link between knower and known is further specified as follows. First, the phenomenal given and the knowing someone are necessarily connected in such a way that the former is "each time perspectivally given" to the latter (SI, 185). Second, and more importantly, the formation of a meaningful cognized is one with the process in which different knowers are intersubjectively isomorphized to become a cognizing Someone (SI, 197; cf. SI, 168; SK, 42-44).[15] Thus the concept of "intersubjectivity (*kanshukansei* or *kyodoshukansei*)"[16] serves as the essential link between cognized and Someone. Countering the notion that the other self is inaccessible to my self (SI, 188ff.), Hiromatsu argues that "while I and the other have as givens different perspectival phenomena," we can share one and the same known, a "single meaningful

cognized" (SI, 189).

We now see how the twofold schemes of both the knower and the known of a phenomenon are combined to form what Hiromatsu terms a fourfold structure (*shishikozo* or *shishiteki-kozo*): A given appears as something more(or else) for someone as Someone (SK, 45; cf. SI, 181, 199), or more precisely, "a phenomenal given is valid as a meaningful cognized to a knowing someone as a cognizing Someone" (SI, 199). These four moments of any phenomenon, as Hiromatsu repeatedly stresses, are not self-contained elememts which posteriorly enter into a relation to each other, but themselves "subsist only as terms of the [fourfold] functional relationship" (SK, 36). The phenomenon, as it is thus structured, is named the *koto* (SI, 199), a Japanese term which, resistent to translation, may only roughly be rendered as 'state of affairs' or *Sachverhalt* (cf. D, 1). Hiromatsu counterposes this *koto* to the *mono*, or the thing (*res*) insofar as it is taken as self-contained. In terms of this pair of concepts, his philosophical project may be epitomized as the overcoming of the reificatory "*mono* world picture" in favor of the "*koto* world-view" (SI, v).

So far we have traced Hiromatsu's 'major' lines of argumentation, whose unfolding is in each phase mediated by the critique of reification. At first glance it seems that the concept of reification is unambiguously articulated in its relation to the concept of fourfold structure or *koto*: Reification refers to a hypostatizing misconception of what is in fourfold structural relation such that one or more terms of this relation appears as independent of the other terms or of the whole relationship. The hypostatization of the meaningful cognized, in particular, which gives rise to the notions of substance and essence, constitutes the typical mode of reification in the cognitive world (cf. SI, 19, 27; SK, 37; BK, 293). More strictly, in terms of the quasi-Hegelian we/it perspectival difference,[17] Hiromatsu defines reification as the circumstance that "a *koto*, which is determined to be relational from the point of view of scholarly reflection (*für uns*), appears as a *mono* to the immediate consciousness involved (*für es*)" (BK, 267; cf. BK, 99). A continual revelation and overcoming of reification in this sense constitutes, as we have seen, precisely Hiromatsu's presentation of the theory of fourfold structure.

It is here crucial to note, however, that this idea of reification in its relation to fourfold structure is formulated within the *synchronic* framework of structural analysis. As Hiromatsu tends to go beyond this framework, there emerges, though not overtly, yet another conception of reification. In the next section, I will pursue this less manifest line of thought of Hiromatsu—one step further than his own presentation—to reconceive reification in the dimension in which phenomena are dynamically structuralized.

## 2. Reification and the Displacement of Meaning

In the introductory section, I suggested a possible shift in the meaning of reification by citing Hiromatsu's comment on his own analysis of linguistic phenomena. To quote it now fully:

> While in this article I have studied things provisionally as they are *reified* in the mode of *langue*, it is necessary in a more rigorous discussion to note that the linguistic formation is 'produced' (reproduced) each time that it is spoken and understood in hearing, and that this is also the case with 'meaning.' The identity and invariability of meaning holds in reality, as it were, only on a meta-level, that is, only insofar as the intentional moment that each time occurs 'productively' is identified reflectively from our point of view (MKK, 190; first italics mine).[18]

Does reification here also mean the misconceiving of the meaningful cognized as independent of the phenomenal given (in this case, the linguistic signifier)? It can hardly be so. For Hiromatsu's main text to which the above note refers has already rejected this kind of reification (MKK, 157ff.). The concept of reification above appears rather to be concerned with the structure in which an identical meaning is maintained over a series of phenomena, that is, with the synchronic scheme of given/cognized itself.

The possibility of such a shift in the meaning of reification will be still harder to ignore if we — here briefly — look at Hiromatsu's analysis of the *practical* world. Arguing generally that human action is carried out "as something more than a mere bodily behavior" (SK, 106), namely, as an interhuman "role-taking" (SK, 105), Hiromatsu points out that roles tend to be fixed and "reified" into "statuses and positions" (YS, Ⅳ-125; cf. SK, 111).[19] In this "institutional reification of the connection of role actions" (YS, Ⅵ-113), he continues, individual actors are "depersonalized and anonymized" (YS, Ⅵ-112; cf. SK, 111).[20] Does this not imply — if we are to avoid inconsistency between the cognitive and the practical dimensions — that "the one," mentioned in the previous section, namely, the depersonalized 'someone more or else,' and hence the "cogizing Someone," are already reificatory, and that so also is the Someone's structural correlate, the meaningful cognized? If this is so, is fourfold structure itself, as it is understood in the synchronic framework, not already a product of reification?

Before directly examining this question, I wish to limit the parallelism that I earlier pointed out between Hiromatsu's and Saussure's relationist views. First, Hiromatsu's concept of signifier is not, as is the Saussurean *signifiant*, a formal factor within the already structured *langue*, but the "material moment" (SI, 168) each time phenomenally given.[21] Second, with regard to the knowing side of phenomena, he starts, as we have seen, from the twofoldness of 'someone as someone (else)' where the latter someone is *not* yet depersonalized into the one or cognizing Someone, but is still a "concrete individual."[22] Given the essential correlation between Someone and cognized, it follows that his theory — at least potentially — has in view the situation in which 'something other than the phenomenal given' is not yet generalized into the meaningful cognized. These points suggest how Hiromatsu's philosophy, while primarily a synchronic structural analysis, diverges from the position of Saussure (at least in his *Cours de linguistique générale*[23]) and structuralism, and opens itself to the dimension of "structural change" — in a broad sense of the term covering "the formation, maintenance, and transformation of structure" (KKK, 258). Notwithstanding Hiromatsu's characterization of his developmental arguments as "an auxiliary means for a theory of the structure of being" (SI, 36), the

developmental, or better, dynamic dimension appears to be of pivotal importance to his thought. This dynamic dimension is concerned not so much with the merely *diachronic* transition of already structured systems, but rather with the very way in which phenomena are structuralized.[24] It is no doubt in terms of this structuralization — in the sense including both de- and re-structuralization — that we can conceive what Hiromatsu calls reification "in the mode of *langue*" or "institutional reification." In what follows, I will explore this dimension of structuralization with a provisional restriction to the known side of phenomena.

Let us begin by analyzing more closely Hiromatsu's account of given/cognized twofoldness with a focus on his underlying dynamic conceptions. First, there seems to be an ambiguity when he characterizes the meaningful cognized as either "something more" or "something other" than the phenomenal given. Yet, well aware of this apparent ambiguity, Hiromatsu seeks to remove it by remarking that, strictly speaking, a meaningful cognized can be said to be "something more" only relatively to another, lower-level meaningful cognized, and not to the phenomenal given. In relation to the phenomenal given on the same level, he continues, the meaningful cognized is just something *else* (MKK, 71f.). To put it differently, it is not more-or-lessness, but "otherness" (MKK, 71) that is fundamental to the relation between given and cognized.

Second, however, there remains another ambiguity, not mentioned as such by Hiromatsu himself, in his formulation of the twofoldness. On the one hand, Hiromatsu states that (a) a phenomenon appears as something "more than a mere 'sensible' given," (SK, 24), or more precisely, something other than a phenomenal given. This formulation readily leads to the synchronic scheme in which the phenomenon comprises the two moments of given and cognized. But, on the other hand: (b) The phenomenon is such that, "in showing itself..., it always already shows something else." Or, as he puts it differently, consciousness "does not receive the given as such, but is aware of it as something other or something more than the given" (SK, 25). These expressions, which amounts to the formula that p appears as something *other than p itself*, imply that the phenomenon contains in itself a movement of becoming other than itself or displacement of itself. It is no doubt this (b) that is relevant to the dynamic dimension, which is rendered invisible in the formulation (a).

To make a third point, I will start by making explicit what Hiromatsu means by the phrase "in itself" (*an sich*) as in the statement that "a phenomenon appears in itself...as something more than a mere 'sensible' given" (SK, 24). According to Hiromatsu, the knower involved is not always conscious of the twofoldness of phenomena:

> We should rather say that, in the *immediate* consciousness of the subject involved, 'something' is in general an utter unity of cognized-given and given-cognized, and that one is rarely aware of 'the given' as bifurcated into moments. In reflective consciousness, however, 'something' as such and 'something' [else] (the 'qualitatively' determined) immediately become bifurcated also for the subject involved... (MKK, 70).[25]

Notwithstanding Hiromatsu's preliminary characterization of the phenomenal world as "the

world as it appears to pre-reflective consciousness" (SK, 21),[26] one cannot maintain the twofold scheme without including reflection on phenomena in the phenomenal world itself. What is more important, however, is Hiromatsu's remark directly following the above: As soon as one is thus conscious of the phenomenal given in distinction to the meaningful cognized, this given is no longer a given as such, but is itself dualized into given and cognized.

> For instance, when one is aware of a 'point' and then tries to make explicit the moment of 'the given' of which one has just been aware *as the 'point*,' one is now aware of that moment as, say, a *'black spot*.' That is, one is aware of the given, anew in a twofold scheme, as a cognized 'black spot,' which is different from the initially cognized 'point.' (MKK, 70).[27]

While this argument of Hiromatsu is meant to prove the non-presence of the phenomenal given "purified" from the meaningful cognized (MKK, 70f.), what is more relevant to our subject lies in the course of the argument itself: Reflection on a phenomenon not only makes explicit its given/cognized twofoldness (p as [p]), but at the same time produces a new twofold formation (p' as [p']), that is, dualizes the phenomenon differently than before. Reflection on a phenomenon, itself involved in the phenomenal world, cannot simply be to view the phenomenon just as it is, but necessarily redetermines it in meaning. In other words, a phenomenon, as soon as it is reflected upon, undergoes a displacement in meaning.[28]

It is reasonable to consider this point, which has for the moment been made with regard to 'downward' reflection, reflection on the phenomenal given, to be equally applicable to 'upward' reflection. A series of 'upward' reflections leads to what Hiromatsu calls the "multifold process," mentioned in the previous section, which may be expressed as 'p as [p] as [[p]]....' Here, the 'as'-connection '...as [[p]],' for example, may be taken to be an addition to the preceding 'as'-connection 'p as [p].' Yet, despite the architechtonic image easily evoked by Hiromatsu's expressions such as "multilayered structure" (STN, 90) or "piling-up" (MKK, 71), the addition of a new twofold connection, which is a reflection on the preceding twofold formation, cannot leave the latter purely intact. Insofar as any reflection on phenomena is itself involved in the relation of phenomena, and the meaning of any phenomenon is determined in relation to other phenomena, it follows that the multifold process is also a process of displacement of meaning.

So far we have traced Hiromatsu's line of thought which tends to go beyond his own synchronic framework, suggesting that phenomena, including reflections on phenomena, intrinsically contain a movement of displacement or self-displacement in meaning. Taking now one step further than Hiromatsu's own accounts, let us examine whether and, if so, how such a displacement occurs in the process in which there arises a meaningful cognized common to different phenomenal givens. While the meaningful cognized is a constitutive moment of a single phenomenon, its existence rather lies in the possibility[29] that it is reproduced as one and the same meaning over a—pontentially indefinite—number of phenomena. This identical meaning, in Hiromatsu's view, does not exist independently of the phenomena, nor can it be derived from them through "inductive abstraction"

(SI, 263; cf. SI, 83ff.). Rather it rests on a "direct equating" (SI, 158) of the phenomena with each other in terms of meaning (SI, 156ff.).[30] This equating, different from the "equating unification" or 'as'-connection within a single phenomenon, is such a relating of different phenomena as, for instance, the case in which one identifies the person just encountered with an old friend (SI, 71, 150), or regards this pine and that cedar equally as trees. Although the identical meaningful cognized ('tree' in the latter example), once established, may precede some specific phenomena, let us start from the situation in which it is first generated through the equating of phenomena.

Hiromatsu thematizes this kind of equating less in his properly epistemological-ontological texts than in his *Shihonron no tetsugaku* (The Philosophy of *Capital*) (1974), specifically in his analysis of Marx's theory of value-form, focusing on the equating (*Gleichsetzung*)[31] of different commodities in their exchange. Although Marx's discussion of "the two factors of commodities"[32] and "the duality of labor,"[33] which correspond to the Hiromatsuan twofoldness of phenomena in the known and the knowing sides, respectively, already prefigures the outline of the fourfold structure (cf. BK, 178), Hiromatsu's analytic efforts center on Marx's subsequent account of value-form, an account of the very process through which this structure is formed.[34] Given the structural parallelism in Hiromatsu's philosophy between the cognitive and the practical dimensions, his mode of analysis of the value-equating of commodities may reasonably be carried over into the equating of phenomena in cognitive meaning.

Let us first consider a series of phenomena $p_1$ (e.g. this pine) and $p_2$ (e.g. that cedar), and suppose that $p_2$ is equated with $p_1$ in meaning. Although this equating does not, as that of commodities, have a quantitative character, it may likewise be expressed as: $p_1 = p_2$. With a provisional focus on the phenomenon $p_1$, we see that $p_1$ assumes twofoldness ($p_1$ as $[p_1]$) through the mediation of its reflective relation with $p_2$. That is, the meaning of $p_1$ is determined in terms of $p_2$ as $p_1$'s 'meaning mirror,' analogous to what Marx calls the "value mirror."[35] This situation, a dualization through equating, may be expressed as:

$$p_1 \text{ as } [p_1 (=p_2)].{}^{36} \tag{1}$$

While, like any other phenomena, $p_1$ is, prior to the above specific equating, already a dual formation of given/cognized, it is newly dualized through this equating, taking on a meaning other than the previous one ('pine').[37] Next, let us suppose that a third phenomenon $p_3$ (e.g. that oak) is equated with both $p_1$ and $p_2$: $p_1 = p_2 = p_3$. Then $p_1$ is again differently dualized, where $p_2$ and $p_3$ serve as $p_1$'s meaning mirrors:

$$p_1 \text{ as } [p_1 (=p_2=p_3)]. \tag{2}$$

The transition from (1) to (2) indicates that the equating of $p_2$, $p_3$, and in general, $p_n$, with $p_1$ each time newly dualizes $p_1$ and redetermines it in meaning. This applies not only to $p_1$, but *mutatis mutandis* also to $p_2$, $p_3$, and so on. It thus follows that each newly added equation '$=p_n$' redetermines all the phenomena with which it is equated, thus bringing about a continual re-articulation of the phenomenal world. In other words, the equating of

phenomena with each other, constitutive of an identical meaningful cognized, cannot be a pure reproduction of the same meaning, but contains a movement that incessantly displaces the meaning from within.

This displacement of meaning, or the displacement of phenomena in meaning, is not in general noticed by the consciousness engaged in the immediate acts of equating themselves. It can first be recognized as such by a reflective consciousness that directs attention to such a transition as that from (1) to (2). Since, however, as we saw above, reflection on phenomena and their meaning generally displaces what is reflected upon, reflection on a displacement of meaning gives rise to yet another displacement. From this it follows that the displacement of meaning cannot be determined unambiguously. This is analogous to, for example, the quantum-mechanical situation, as it is analyzed by Niels Bohr, in which the interaction between objects and measuring instruments "cannot be controlled" because any attempt to determine such an interaction in its turn introduces "new possibilities of interaction."[38] It is thus reasonable to characterize, in parallel with Bohr's terminolgy, the displacement of meaning as in principle 'uncontrollable.'

Under certain — prevalent if not ubiquitous — circumstances, however, this uncontrollable displacement seems on the surface to be eliminated. Let us suppose that, from the series of phenomena, one picks up a specific phenomenon $p^*$, and gives priority to the equations having $p^*$ on the right sides, namely $p_1 = p^*$, $p_2 = p^*, \ldots$, and thus to the 'as'-connections having $p^*$ as the sole meaning mirror, '$p_1$ as $[p_1 (=p^*)]$,' '$p_2$ as $[p_2 (=p^*)]$,' $\ldots$. In this case, $p^*$ comes to serve as the sign in the narrow sense (e.g. the linguistic sign 'tree') which exclusively represents all the other phenomena in question, thus structurally stabilizing[39] the connection of the phenomena. $p^*$ may then be termed the general signifier, and the meaning common to all the phenomena the general signified.[40] Denoting this general signified by $[p^*]$, we can express the structure thus stabilized as:

$$p_1, \ p_2, \ \ldots \ \text{as} \ [p^*]. \tag{3}$$

Again speaking in analogy with Marx's theory of value-form, this structure corresponds to the general form of value[41] and the money form,[42] $p^*$ to the "general equivalent"[43] or money, $[p^*]$ to the value of commodities as commensurated by the general equivalent. Since, in accordance with Hiromatsu's view, the sign $p^*$ is in principle nothing more than a phenomenon beside $p_1$, $p_2$, and so on, its introduction does not alter the fact that the equating of phenomena displace them in meaning. Nevertheless, this displacement tends to be concealed as a result of the above structural stabilization. For, under formula (3), it seems as if the meaning of the phenomena $p_1$, $p_2, \ldots$ were determined in terms of $p^*$ alone, thus fixed once and for all, that is, without being continually redetermined as in the transition from (1) to (2). This leads to the notion that the series of phenomena shares the purely identical meaning $[p^*]$. Furthermore, once the structure (3) is set up for the phenomena $p_1$, $p_2, \ldots$, $p_n$, a further equating of $p_{n+1}$ with these phenomena seems to be confined to the same structure, despite the fact that this equating again displaces the phenomena in meaning.[44] In my view, it is precisely this kind of concealment of dynamic movement involving the displacement of meaning that constitutes what Hiromatsu calls

reification "in the mode of *langue*" or "institutional reification." This reification no longer refers primarily to a substantializing notion of what is in a synchronic relationship. The concept of reification is rather dynamically redefined as *the apparent reduction of displacing movement to a synchronic structure*.[45]

From this perspecitive, we can reexamine Hiromatsu's analogy of the meaningful cognized to the mathematical function. Hiromatsu indeed stresses that, in this analogy, what really exists is solely the function $f(x, y, z, ...)$ with specific values inserted into its variables $x, y, z, ...$, and not the function itself as it is independent of the inserted values (SI, 22f.). Yet our consideration above indicates a further point he does not make explicit. Namely, the equation of different phenomena corresponds to the substitution of specific values, not to an already existing function, but rather *to other specific values*. And it is a series of such substitutions that first generates a 'function,' while at the same time altering and displacing it. In contrast, the mathematical function, while not independent of the whole set of substitutible values, is in general considered to remain purely the same regardless of the specific values substituted each time, insofar as these values are within the range for which the function is defined in advance.[46] To put it differently, the validity (*Gültigkeit*) of a function implies its indifference (*Gleichgültigkeit*) to the specific values. In fact, in his analysis of the practical world, Hiromatsu himself introduces the concept of function to characterize the situation in which the personality of each individual becomes "irrelevant (*gleichgültig*)" to the relation of roles (SK, 111, cf. SK, 34). This enables us to see how the meaningful cognized is different in character from the mathematical function. It is by virtue of this difference that the "structural form" of phenomena, a specific kind of the meaningful cognized (KKK, 275), is subject to change.[47] This being the case, the analogy of meaning to the mathematical function, insofar as the latter is understood in the above manner, proves to be already reificatory — reificatory in the sense we have developed for the dynamic dimension. In other words, reification, as it is dynamically reconceived, refers precisely to the situation in which different phenomena $p_1, p_2, ...$ seem to be functionally subsumed (MKK, 140) under a general signified $[p^*]$.[48]

In this paper, after outlining Hiromatsu's analysis of the cognitive world, I have sought to extend it to the dynamic dimension in a manner that follows as closely as possible his own dynamic conceptions. This has led us, in a large part beyond what he himself explicitly indicates, to see that the equating of different phenomena, while constitutive of an identical meaningful cognized, inevitably subjects them to displacement in meaning, and further to characterize the apparent reduction of this displacement as reification in the dynamic dimension. It is noteworthy, among other implications, that the critique of reification, thus dynamically reconceived, appears to be convergent with certain ideas of poststructuralism, notably with Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of the "metaphysics of presence." Derrida's point that the possibility of repetition or iteration is constitutive of the identity and ideality of meaning,[49] and that this iterability alters and displaces "what it identifies and enables to repeat 'itself,'"[50] is not only parallel to the views we have developed, but may be adequately approached and reexamined from our perspective, which could in turn be further developed

by essential reference to Derrida's thought.[51] As a next step of our inquiry into Hiromatsu's philosophy, however, we must start by explicitly taking into account the knowing side of phenomena, and thus the intersubjective fourfold structure, and further enlarge our vision to include the practical aspect of the world.

## Abbreviations

BK    *Busshokaron no kozu* (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 1983)

D    "Autour de la différance," tr. K. Adachi, unpublished

HK    *Hegel soshite Marx* (Tokyo: Seidosha, 1991)

KKK    "Kozo no keisei-iji-suiten no kisei (1)," *Episteme*, II-1 (1985), 258-295

KZ    *Kototeki-sekaikan e no zensho: busshokaron no ninshikironteki-sonzaironteki iso* (Tokyo: Keiso-shobo, 1975)

MC    *Marx-shugi no chihei* (Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 1969)

MKK    *Mono, koto, kotoba* (Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 1979)

PMN    "La philosophie de Marx 《pour nous》," tr. Takashi Minatomichi, *Le Marxisme au Japon*, *Actuel Marx*, 2 (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987), pp. 72-84

SBSY    Hiromatsu (ed.), *Shihonron o busshokaron o shijiku ni shite yomu* (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1986)

SI    *Sonzai to imi: kototeki-sekaikan no teiso*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 1981)

SK    *Sekai no kyodoshukanteki-sonzaikozo* (Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 1972)

SM    *Shinshin-mondai* (Tokyo: Seidosha, 1989)

SRT    *Sotaiseiriron no tetsugaku* (1981; Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 1986)

ST    *Shihonron no tetsugaku* (Tokyo: Gendaihyoronsha, 1974)

STN    *Shin-tetsugaku-nyumon* (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 1988)

TE    *Tetsugaku no ekkyo: koiron no ryoya e* (Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 1992)

TI    *Tetsugaku-nyumon-ippomae* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1988)

YS    "Yakuwari-riron no saikochiku no tame ni: hyojo-genso, taijin-oto, yakuwari-kodo," I, *Shiso* (May, 1986), 1-28; II, *Shiso* (June, 1986), 33-59; III, *Shiso* (June, 1986), 87-114; IV, *Shiso* (November, 1986), 123-151; V, *Shiso* (December, 1986), 126-154; VI, *Shiso* (March, 1987), 106-135; VII, *Shiso* (August, 1987), 91-127; VIII, *Shiso* (October, 1987), 136-171; IX, *Shiso* (March, 1988), 106-143.

## Notes

1    For all its profound domestic influence, Hiromatsu's work, all of which is originally written in Japanese, has long been virtually unknown abroad. Only recently has one of his short texts as well as several introductory articles on his work appeared in Western languages: a French translation (PMN) of HM, Chap. 5; Toshio Yamada, "Les tendances du marxisme japonais contemporain," in *Le marxisme au Japon*, *Actuel*

*Marx*, 2 (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987), pp. 34-44; Susumu Takenaga, "Wataru Hiromatsu (éd.), Lire le Capital — Système des Réifications Capitalistes," ibid., pp. 91-92; Michael A. Santone Jr., "Ernst Mach's Influence on Four Japanese Thinkers," in John Blackmore (ed.), *Ernst Mach — A Deeper Look: Documents and New Perspectives*, *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 143 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992), pp. 333-361.

2 Far from granting fundamental priority to the cognitive over the practical, Hiromatsu holds that "the cognitive world is nothing more than a structural moment or perspectival cross-section of the practical world" (SI, xi). Yet, with a view to dealing squarely with the modern philosophical tradition, which has primarily been concerned with the cognitive dimension, he finds it convenient to *start* with this dimension.

3 The original Japanese term for 'modern' here is *kindaiteki*, whose noun form is *kindai*. By this *kindai*, roughly equivalent to the German *Neuzeit*, Hiromatsu means the predominantly capitalist period which has followed the Middle Ages (SK, 5) and stretches to the present age or *gendai*. Often, however, he contrasts *kindai* with *gendai*, the latter being understood as the age that follows and replaces *kindai*. In this case, it might appear to be reasonable to translate *kindaiteki* as 'early modern' or 'classical modern.' Yet it is crucial for Hiromatsu that we are now in the transitional phase of history which witnesses "an overall breakdown of the *kindaiteki* world-view" (SK, 5), whose replacement by a new, *gendaiteki* world-view is just under way and yet to be accomplished.

4 Hiromatsu's systematic philosophy goes hand in hand with his reconstruction of the thought of Marx and Marxism, which characterizes Marx's conceptual development as a transition from the theory of alienation, still confined within the subject/object framework, to the theory of reification, oriented toward a relationist world-view (see, for example, MC, 232ff.). This reconstructive work is in its turn sustained by Hiromatsu's extensive text critique, whose major outcome is a re-edition of Marx and Engels's *Die deutsche Ideologie* (Tokyo: Kawadeshobo-shinsha, 1974). In the present paper, however, I cannot enter into this area of his scholarship.

5 Here I will not directly deal with Hiromatsu's account of judgment, which starts with an analysis of the meta-grammatical subject/predicate structure as a specific kind of given/cognized scheme (SI, 288), proceeding toward a reconceiving of affirmation and negation on the basis of interpersonal agreement and disagreement (SI, 329).

6 Hiromatsu, a co-translator of Mach's *Die Analyse der Empfindungen* and other writings, has developed his philosophical views not least through critical analysis of Mach's philosophy. He holds that, while Mach's philosophy is as such untenable, a close reexamination of it will provide "suitable clues to our radically going beyond the horizon of modern philosophy in general" (KZ, 51). For Hiromatsu's analysis of the relation between Mach and Einstein, see Santone, op. cit., note 1, pp. 351-361.

7 On Hiromatsu's more detailed account, the subject/object schema implies "the individuality of the subject," "the trialism of knowledge" (conscious act, the content of consciousness, and the object itself), and "the interiority of the given" (SK. 7). See

Santone, op. cit., note 1, pp. 351f. Hiromatsu's criticism is chiefly directed against the notion, which he calls "the camera-model view of perception," that perception is the formation of mental images *within* the knowing subject as the result of stimuli coming from the outside (STN, 19ff.).

8　In his earlier texts, Hiromatsu used the term *imiteki-shochi* (the meaningful known) instead of *imiteki-shoshiki* (the meaningful cognized), thus giving rise to a double meaning of *shochi*:　as against *nochi* (knower) and as against *shoyo* (the given). To remove this ambiguity, he has introduced in *Sonzai to imi* the neologism *shoshiki* (the cognized), while reserving *shochi* for what comprises both *shoyo* and *shoshiki* (SI, xvi). The term *shoshiki* is a combination of Chinese characters whose intrinsic meaning is not substantially different from that of *shochi*, no more than my translation 'cognized' is from 'known.'

9　As regards this "equating unification," Hiromatsu cautions us not — as its very name tempts us to do — to "stress one-sidedly [its] moment of 'identity'" as against that of difference (YS, II-56).

10　According to Hiromatsu, the symbol in the narrow sense is, in counterdistinction to the signal, that sub-concept of the sign which refers to the signitive phenomenon that primarily performs "predicative functions." Symbolic combination, however, covers the totality of signitive functions (YS, II-50).

11　It appears that, without impairing what Hiromatsu means here, the meaningful cognized could well be likened to the mathematical *variable* rather than to the function. The analogy to the function is employed, however, so as to emphasize the relational character of the meaningful cognized (personal communication).

12　The original Japanese term *taishoteki*, the standard translation of the German *gegenständlich*, cannot be rendered as 'objective' without causing confusion. Objectivity (*kyakkansei*), which Hiromatsu reconceives as nothing other than intersubjectivity (e.g. SI, 354), is a characteristic of the meaningful cognized (SK, 26), and not of the known as a whole.

13　Hiromatsu treats an epistemologically parallel case in his analysis of Einstein's theory of relativity. Underlying the logic of relativity theory is, on Hiromatsu's interpretation, the intersubjective relation between two observers of different coordinate frames, each of whom, while retaining his own observational standpoint, starts communication by assuming in thought the other's standpoint as well (cf. KZ, 172ff.; STR, 69f.). See also note 15.

14　Just as in the case of *shochi* and *shoshiki* (cf. note 8), one can hardly distinguish the intrinsic meanings of *nochiteki* (knowing) and *noshikiteki* (cognizing) — Hiromatsu's neologisms — on the one hand, and *taregashi* (someone) and *arumono* (Someone), on the other. The philosophically relevant distinction rests entirely on Hiromatsu's original usage of the terms.

15　In Hiromatsu's analysis of relativity theory, it is essential that each of the two observers grasps the "phenomenon-for-himself" and "phenomenon-for-the-other" in an identical meaningful cognized, which mathematically corresponds to the coordinate

transformation, and that the formation of this meaningful cognized is correlative to the intersubjective isomorphization of the observers (SRT, 69f.).

16  As Japanese words for 'intersubjectivity,' Hiromatsu uses both *kanshukansei* and *kyodoshukansei* with nuances somewhat different from each other. The term *kanshukansei*, comprising *kan* (between) and *shukansei* (subjectivity), reproduces literally the original sense of intersubjectivity, whereas *kyodoshukansei*, with *kyodo* meaning 'common' or 'joint,' lays emphasis on the togetherness of the subjects, so that it could in some cases better be rendered as 'cosubjectivity.' Hiromatsu does not, however, strictly distinguish the two terms, rather holding that *kanshukansei* also implies *kyodoshukansei* (cf. SK, 45). I wish to examine elsewhere whether this virtual equivalence between intersubjectivity and cosubjectivity does not break down outside the synchronic framework.

17  As Hiromatsu notes, the "we" in his — as well as Marx's — sense is different from the Hegelian *wir* in that it does not stand in the position of absolute knowledge, but is relative to the specific stage of the dialogical-dialectical processes in which it is formed (TE, 24; HM, 279; PMN, 84).

18  Elsewhere, with regard to the practical situation, Hiromatsu makes a parallel remark: The "norm" of action is "produced and reproduced" each time that the persons involved act in a specific manner; "it is a reifying misconception to regard the norm as self-contained" (YS, VI-127).

19  In his later work, Hiromatsu introduces a distinction between *yakuwari* and *yakugara*, both of which are commonly translated as 'role.' Namely, while by *yakuwari* meaning 'role' in general, he reserves *yakugara* for the role that is already fixed as status or position (YS, IV-125).

20  As regards historical laws, Hiromatsu maintains that "it is through a reification of the activity of individuals that historical-social lawfulness holds" (MC, 190; cf. BK, 115, 124; SK, 126). In his analysis of the cognitive world, however, he characterizes as reificatory, not so much the law or lawfulness itself, but rather the notion that the law 'governs' individual facts (SI, 485). This appears to be another illustration of the fact that Hiromatsu's dynamic conceptions come forth more visibly in the practical than in the cognitive dimension.

21  Toshiaki Kobayashi, putting in question Hiromatsu's concept of signifier as a real given, remarks that this concept, unlike the Saussurean *signifiant*, could lead to "a regression toward the classical notion of sign." Kobayashi, ⟨*Kotonari*⟩ *no genshogaku* (The Phenomenology of 'Differance') (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1987), p. 203. Despite a high degree of convergence of Kobayashi's and my general views on Hiromatsu, it rather appears to me that Hiromatsu's deviation here from Saussure's position indicates his tendency to go beyond his own synchronic framework.

22  In his formulation of the twofoldness of knowing someone and cognizing Someone, Hiromatsu inserts a qualifying phrase: This twofoldness holds "except for the latent 'knowing subject' in the developmentally initial phase" (SI, 148). No less important is Hiromatsu's statement elsewhere that some kinds of mental illness may be characterized

as a "disintegration" of the cognizing Someone (TE, 255). These remarks imply his acknowledgment that there *are* phases or cases in which the cognizing Someone is either not yet established or has already collapsed, and hence that phenomena are *not* always stabilized in a fourfold structure.

23  Here I set aside the question whether and to what extent Saussure's *Cours de linguistique général*, posthumously compiled and published, represents his original thought as it is reconstructed by Keizaburo Maruyama in his *Saussure no shiso* (The Thought of Saussure) (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 1981).

24  Hiromatsu remarks, for example, that the fourfold structure "consists solely in the *process* relationship" (SK, 43f., my emphasis) between the moments of phenomena, notably between the meaningful cognized and the cognizing Someone in their correlative formation.

25  In this quote as well as the next, I have translated *shochi* as the cognized, not as the known, because by *shochi* Hiromatsu here means *shoshiki*, though the term had yet to be introduced. See note 8.

26  Hiromatsu acknowledges the "fictional" character of such a pre-reflective world (SK, 22), noting that we cannot free ourselves from prejudgment or preunderstanding relative to our historical and social conditions (SI, 32).

27  In *Sonzai to imi*, Hiromatsu makes a similar point by the example of Rubin's figure. One may, on his account, at first say that the black-and-white figure is seen either as a vase or as two facing profiles (SI, 5). As soon, however, as this black-and-white figure is perceived as such, it becomes "yet another meaningful cognized beside the two profiles and vase" (SI, 7).

28  If this is applied to the case of scholarly reflection, it follows that scholarly knowledge, including mine as well as Hiromatsu's, cannot literally — as some of his remarks tend to misleadingly suggest — view the phenomenal world "just as it really is" (SK, 22), but itself necessarily subjects the world to displacement in meaning.

29  The word 'possibility' is put here to reflect Hiromatsu's view that the meaningful cognized, while it must be reproducible, need not be *actually* reproduced over different phenomena (SM, 84).

30  This applies to phenomena that stand separately from each other in what Hiromatsu calls the mode of "that/this" (SI, 156ff.). This mode, in his view, constitutes the third stage of the process in which phenomena are progressively articulated. In the first stage, something is "congealed from the 'nothing-ground' to become a 'figure'" (SI. 151), and in the second, the figure and the ground are differentiated so that the former appears as self-identical (SI, 153f.). This is followed by the third stage, in which two such figures stand in distinction to each other (SI, 156).

31  Karl Marx, *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, vol. 1, 1st ed. (Hamburg: Otto Meissner, 1867), p. 766.

32  Marx, *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, vol. 1, *Marx-Engels Werke*, vol. 23 (Berlin: Dietz, 1962), p. 49.

33  Ibid., p. 51.

34 It should be noted that Hiromatsu considers the simple form of value to be already a "constitutive moment" of the total or expanded form of value (SBSY, 41; cf. ST, 146), and does not exactly treat the transition from the former to the latter—and further to the general form of value—as a dynamic process of structuralization. My analysis below, however, will start from the equating of two phenomena without presupposing the structures corresponding to the expanded and general forms of value.

35 Marx, op. cit., note 32, p. 67.

36 As mentioned in the first section, Hiromatsu holds that any identification of a meaning, say [p], is already mediated by its difference from other meaning, [q], [r],.... For the sake of simplicity, however, *this* reflective determination is not explicitly dealt with here.

37 When $p_2$ is equated with $p_1$, $p_1$ may perceptually have disappeared and be reproduced in memory. In this case, $p_2$ is equated not directly with the 'original' $p_1$, but with a reproductive remembrance thereof.

38 Niels Bohr, *Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge* (New York: Wiley, 1958), p. 40. According to Bohr, this uncontrollability of interaction leads to the complementary relation between "the space-time co-ordination and the claim of causality." Bohr, *Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934), p. 54. Further, he extends this view beyond physics to the cognitive process in general, pointing out the complementarity "between the analysis of a concept and its immediate application" (ibid., p. 20). This enlarged conception of complementarity may be adequately analyzed on the basis of our views developed in the present study.

39 In his analysis of the practical world, Hiromatsu speaks of the "structural stabilization" of the relation of cooperative acts of different persons (YS, Ⅳ-124).

40 These terms, general signifier and general signified, are essentially linked to what Jacques Derrida calls "transcendental signifier" and "transcendental signified," respectively. Derrida, *De la grammatologie* (Paris: Minuit, 1967), p. 71; *Positions* (Paris: Minuit, 1972), pp. 30, 120.

41 Marx, op. cit., note 32, pp. 79-84.

42 Ibid., pp. 84f.

43 Ibid., p. 81.

44 This is the mechanism by which, for example, linguistically-expressed meaning, though "in an incessant process of formation and change," tends to be seemingly fixed and ready-made (SI, 179). See Katsuhiko Asami, "Busshoka-ron no ideologie-teki boken," *Critique*, 8 (1987), 7-32, on p. 29.

45 In his account of the practical world, Hiromatsu himself comes closer to our view formulated here when he points to "the mechanism of reification" by which the norms of action, "despite their plasticity," have an apparent "self-identity and rigidity" (YS, Ⅴ-152).

46 This appears to make it questionable to contrast "functional unity" with "rigid self-identity" (SI, 26).

47 Hiromatsu remarks that the meaningful cognized, while remaining self-identical "within

certain limits," "can be experienced as something else...if it changes beyond [these] limits" (MKK, 73). It should also be noted, however, that these limits are *not*, as in the case of mathematical functions, predetermined.

48　This reification appears to be most strongly urged in knowledge in the physical sciences, which is essentially mediated by the use of mathematical functions. It follows that relativity theory and quantum mechanics, which Hiromatsu positively evaluates with regard to their tendency to overcome substantialism and the subject/object schema (cf. KZ, 164ff.), will nevertheless be subject to a dynamically reformulated critique of reification. Such a critique, in my view, can take as a clue Bohr's concept of complementarity, which appears to contain an insight into what I call the uncontrollable displacement of meaning. See note 38.

49　Derrida, *La voix et le phénomène* (Paris: PUF, 1967), pp. 8, 58.

50　Derrida, *Limited Inc.* (Paris: Galilée, 1990), p. 120.

51　In a symposium held on the occasion of Derrida's visit to Japan in 1983, Hiromatsu outlined his philosophical views with reference to Derrida's idea of *différance*, remarking that the "unity of identity and difference" in the 'as'-connection of given and cognized "corresponds precisely to Derridean differance" (D, 10; cf. D, 8). Given the lack of his thematic analysis of Derrida's work, however, the relation between the thought of the two philosophers is yet to be examined. I wish to undertake this task on another occasion with an explicit reference to Kobayashi's critique — oriented to a Derridean conception of *différance* — of Hiromatsu's philosophy. See note 21.